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transaction costs may induce informed investors to herd. Moreover, for low levels of transaction costs, informed investors 
trade both the large and the small quantity of the asset. Finally, if transaction costs are very low and the market width is large 
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Recent research on market microstructure has shown a renewed interest in imita-
tive behavior in ￿nancial economies. Several exceptional events in asset markets
in the past years seem to contradict the e¢ cient market paradigm. For example,
on 19 October 1987, US stock prices fell by 22 per cent on the one day. It is
di¢ cult to identify some relevant economic news at the time that could account
for a fall of this size. Again, the overpricing of US technology stocks in the sec-
ond half 1990s cannot be fully explained in terms of e¢ cient market hypothesis
framework. Herding behavior has often been cited as one of the factors that can
generate serious asset price ine¢ ciencies and misbehavior.
Traditionally, herding has been related to irrational decision makers. The
recent theoretical literature has advanced new rational models of herding. In-
formational cascades belong to this strand of literature on rational herding.1
An informational cascade occurs where it is optimal for individuals, after
observing the actions of previous agents, to ignore their own information and
mimic the decisions of their predecessors. The standard models of informational
cascades apply to frameworks where prices are ￿xed, and therefore they can
hardly be applied to asset markets, where prices adjust continuously to re￿ ect
all the relevant information. However, some recent theoretical models have
analyzed mechanisms that may lead to informational cascades in asset markets.
The most interesting results of this strand of literature are the following.
In the standard setting proposed by Glosten and Milgrom [9], price adjustment
prevents the occurrence of an informational cascade in equilibrium. Neverthe-
less, multidimensional uncertainty and, more generally, non-monotonic signals
open the possibility of herd behavior that may lead to a signi￿cant, short-run
mispricing of assets (Avery and Zemsky, [1]). Moreover, informational cascades
may develop in the case of di⁄erent risk aversion among traders and market
makers (Decamps and Lovo [6]; Cipriani and Guarino [4]), when traders care
about their reputation for ability (Dasgupta and Prat [5]), if informed market
participants must pay a brokerage fee to trade (Lee [12]), or in the case of costly
market making (Romano [13]).
Extant literature focuses on frameworks where traders are restricted to trans-
act a ￿xed quantity of the stock. However, during the last decades the impor-
tance of block trading in common stocks has raised signi￿cantly. On the New
York Stock Exchange, the fraction of large transactions represented just two
percent of the volume of trading in 1960 and over one half in 2001.2 This has
underscored the importance of studying the impact of block trading on stock
prices and on the occurrence of informational cascades. 3
1Informational Cascades ￿rst appeared in Banerjee [2] and in Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer
and Welch [3]. Banerjee [2] and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch [3] independently show
in di⁄erent settings that informational cascades (or "herding", in Banerjee￿ s terminology) will
eventually occur with certainty.
2Gemmill and Lakonishok [8]; Keim and Madhavan [10].
3Keim and Madhavan [11]; Saar [14]; Seppi [15].
1This paper aims at contributing to this research area by analyzing informa-
tional cascades arising from transaction costs increasing in the trade size, in
capital markets with asymmetric information, sequential trading and competi-
tive price mechanism.
To this purpose, we develop a sequential trading model where traders are
allowed to transact di⁄erent trade sizes. This ability to transact orders for large
or small quantities introduces a strategic element in the trading game. Informed
traders choose their optimal order size given the price schedule. If risk neutral
informed traders wish to trade, they prefer to trade larger amount at any given
price. Consequently, the market maker sets a larger spread for larger trades in
every equilibrium with information based trading. The crucial assumption is
that the market maker bears an exogenous cost for executing orders which is
proportional to the trade size. Such cost gives informed traders an incentive to
purchase small, rather than large quantity.
We show that, for any public belief about the true asset value, three types
of equilibria can arise depending on the magnitude of the transaction cost. In
the separating equilibrium, informed traders place only large orders. Hence,
small orders are uninformative and the spread for small quantities only re￿ ects
the exogenous transaction cost. This outcome occurs if the transaction cost
is very low and the di⁄erence between the size of large and small orders is
su¢ ciently large. For intermediate values of the transaction cost, a pooling
equilibrium prevails in the market. In this equilibrium, informed traders trade
both the large and the small amounts. The large trade spread reduces with
respect to the separating equilibrium, whereas the spread for small quantities
increases because of information costs. Finally, if the transaction cost exceeds
the informational advantage of traders observing private signals on the true asset
value, all informed traders prefer to refrain from trading. Orders do not convey
any information about the fundamental value and the exogenous transaction
cost is the only source of the spread for both small and large quantities.
The informational content of orders reaches its maximum level in the sepa-
rating equilibrium. It reduces when a pooling equilibrium prevails in the market
and tends to zero in the no-trading equilibrium, as an informational cascade de-
velops. As in Romano [13], trading volume gradually is shown to decrease before
a cascade occurs, and to reach its lowest value as the cascade develops.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 3 we describe
the model. In section 3 we de￿ne and derive the market equilibrium and discuss
the impact of transaction costs on the learning process. In section 4 we conclude.
All the proofs of propositions are in the appendix.
22 The Economy
We consider a sequential trading model ￿ a la Glosten and Milgrom [9], modi￿ed
to account for di⁄erent trade sizes.4
The market is for a risky asset which is exchanged among a sequence of risk
neutral traders and competitive market makers who are responsible for quoting
prices. The value e V of the asset can be low (e V = V ) or high (e V = V ). The
ex-ante probability of e V = V is ￿0 2 (0; 1).
Trades occur sequentially, with one trader allowed to transact at any point
of time. The trader whose turn is to transact may either buy a small or a large
quantity, or sell a small or a large quantity, or refrain from trading. We denote
by QS and QL, with QS < QL, the size, respectively, of small and large orders,
and by A ￿ fSQL; SQS; BQS; BQL; NTg the traders￿action space, with
SQiand BQi indicating, respectively, a sell and a buy order for quantity Qi,
with i = S;L, and NT indicating a zero trading order.
There are two types of traders: liquidity traders (fraction 1￿￿) and informed
traders (fraction ￿). To simplify the analysis, we assume that liquidity traders
choose to submit large or small sell and buy orders and to refrain from trading
with equal probability ￿ =
1￿￿
5 .
Informed traders privately observe a signal ￿ correlated with the asset value.
The set of private signals is ￿ = f￿;￿g; the signal ￿ indicates V and the signal ￿
indicates V . We assume that signals are symmetric and we let be p = Pr(￿jV ) =
Pr(￿jV ) > 1
2.
The expected asset value of an informed trader at time t is denoted by
Et[e V j ￿] and the market maker￿ s expectation by Et[e V ]. Finally, we denote by
￿t the probability that market maker attaches to V at time t.5
Before a trader arrives, the market maker sets bid and ask prices at which
he is willing to trade each asset quantity. We suppose that any transaction costs
to the market maker c ￿ Q euros, where Q 2 fQS; QLg.
3 The Equilibrium Strategies and Prices
At the beginning of any trading round t, the market maker sets competitive
prices. We denote Pt the price schedule at time t. Clearly:
Pt = fBL;t; BS;t; AS;t; AL;t g
where BL;t is the bid price for the large quantity, BS;t the bid price for the
small quantity, AS;t the ask price for the small quantity, and AL;t the ask price
4The approach taken involves a sequential trade model similar to that of Easley and O￿ Hara
[7].
5By the Bayes rule:
Et[e V j ￿] = V +
￿t
￿t + (1 ￿ ￿t)
Pr(￿jV )
Pr(￿jV )
￿ (V ￿ V );
which exceeds Et[e V ] if ￿ = ￿, and which is lower than Et[e V ] if ￿ = ￿.
3for the large quantity.
After prices are set, a trader, randomly selected to trade, observes the price
schedule and plays his strategy.
If the selected trader is a liquidity trader, he acts in the ex-ante speci￿ed
probabilistic way. If the selected trader is informed, he chooses the strategy
which maximizes his expected pro￿t given the price schedule.
The market maker anticipates the strategies of informed traders and an-
nounces his price schedule. Bertrand competition restricts the market maker to
earn zero expected pro￿t from each trade. Hence, the trader arriving at t faces
a price schedule which satis￿es:
Bi;t = Et[e V jSQi] ￿ c 8i 2 fS; Lg
Ai;t = Et[e V jBQi] + c 8i 2 fS; Lg:
(1)
Following Easly and O￿ Hara [7], we are interested in an equilibrium price
schedule P￿
t in which bid prices B￿
S;t and B￿
L;t and ask prices A￿
S;t and A￿
L;t
straddle the unconditional expected asset value Et[e V ]. Given a such equilibrium,
traders observing a good signal will never prefer to sell the asset, and traders
with a bad signal will never prefer to buy the asset. However, depending on the
parameters of the model, di⁄erent outcomes may prevail. If informed traders
prefer to trade only the large quantity, they are separated from small liquidity
traders. We call this a separating equilibrium. If informed traders submit either
small or large orders with positive probability, a pooling equilibrium occurs. If
they prefer to refrain from trading, a no trading equilibrium occurs.
It is useful to stress that the equilibrium on one side of the market may di⁄er
from the equilibrium on the other side. For example, traders observing ￿ may
prefer to sell only large quantity and traders observing ￿ may choose to buy
with positive probability either small or large quantity. In the next sections we
show how di⁄erent outcomes can occur by changing the transaction cost c.
3.1 The no-trading equilibrium
In the no-trading equilibrium, no sell or buy order arises from informed traders.
Since transactions are not information based, they do not a⁄ect the probability
that the market maker attaches to V , and the expected asset value, conditional
on a trading order, is always equal to the unconditional expectation. Therefore,




L g6 such that:
Bne
L = Bne
S = E[e V ] ￿ c = Bne
Ane
S = Ane
L = E[e V ] + c = Ane:
Pne is an equilibrium price schedule when the expected pro￿t from trading
for informed is strictly negative whatever quantity of asset they choose to sell or
6For brevity we omit the time subscript.
4buy. In particular, the no-trading equilibrium prevails in the ask side of market
when E[e V j￿] ￿ Ane < 0, that is true only if:
c > (
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)
1￿p
p
￿ ￿) ￿ (V ￿ V ) = cne(￿; ￿):
Similarly, the bid side of market is in the no-trading equilibrium when Bne￿
E[e V j￿] < 0, that is true only if:
c > (￿ ￿
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)
p
1￿p
) ￿ (V ￿ V ) = cne(￿; ￿):
These results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 For any public belief ￿ 2 (0; 1) on e V = V , a no-trading equilib-
rium prevails in the bid side of market if, and only if, c > cne(￿; ￿). It prevails
in the ask side of market if, and only if, c > cne(￿; ￿).
cne(￿; ￿) is equal to the informational advantage of traders observing ￿.
Hence, the no-trading equilibrium prevails if the marginal transaction cost ex-
ceeds the informational advantage of informed traders.
To gain an intuition about the link between the public belief on the true asset
value and the threshold costs, that is the informational advantage of informed
traders, let￿ s consider the limit case of perfect signals (p = 1), and suppose that
e V = V . Since signals are perfect, the expected asset value of informed traders
is always V , whatever public belief. The informational advantage of informed
traders is equal to (V ￿V )(1￿￿). It is low if the probability the market maker
attaches to V is high, and it grows as the public belief about V approaches to
0. Then, the more the valuation of the market di⁄ers from V , the higher the
cost that informed are willing to pay in order to transact.
In a similar way, when signals are not perfect (p < 1), the informational
advantage of traders observing ￿ is low if the public belief is consistent with
￿, and it grows as the valuation of the market maker moves in the opposite
direction with respect to the signal. But, unlike the case of perfect signals, if
the market maker attaches a very low probability to the asset value consistent
with ￿, then the informational advantage of traders observing ￿ decreases. This
occurs because, when signals are not perfect, the expectation of informed traders
depends not only on the private signal, but also on the public belief. If the past
history of trades strictly indicates a value inconsistent with ￿, traders observing
this signal attach a low weight to their private information respect to the public
belief. However, if the market attaches a greater probability to V (￿ < 1
2), the
informational advantage of traders observing ￿ is greater than that of traders
observing ￿; if the market attaches a greater probability to V (￿ > 1
2), the
reverse is true.
5As a consequence, the threshold cost for the no trading equilibrium in the
ask side of market exceeds that in the bid side when the market maker attaches
a greater probability to V (￿ < 1
2) and it is lower otherwise.
In the no-trading equilibrium, no new information reaches the market be-
cause all informed traders choose to refrain from trading. Therefore, the econ-
omy is in an informational cascade.
It is interesting to notice that, the occurrence of an informational cascade
does not depend on the asset quantities that agents can sell or buy. This re-
sult follows from the interaction between the risk neutrality of agents and the
assumption of constant marginal transaction costs.
3.2 The separating equilibrium
A separating equilibrium prevails in the market when the competitive price




L g, is such that informed traders place only
large orders. Thus, small trades are not information-based and do not a⁄ect the
public belief about the true asset value, while the information content of large
trades is very strong.
This implies that, the equilibrium prices for the small orders are given by:
Bse
S = V + ￿ ￿ (V ￿ V ) ￿ c
Ase
S = V + ￿ ￿ (V ￿ V ) + c;
and the equilibrium prices for the large orders are given by:
Bse
L = V + ￿
￿+(1￿￿)￿se
SQL
￿ (V ￿ V ) ￿ c
Ase
L = V + ￿
￿+(1￿￿)￿se
BQL









￿+￿p are, respectively, the like-
lihood ratio of a large sell and buy order. Clearly, ￿
se
SQL > 1 because a large
selling order could be submitted by a trader with a bad signal and ￿
se
BQL < 1
to re￿ ect the probability of trading with a trader observing a good signal.
A separating equilibrium prevails only if, given the price schedule Pse, in-
formed traders prefer to trade large. For the bid side of the market this means:
(Bse
L ￿ E[e V j￿])QL ￿ (Bse
S ￿ E[e V j￿])QS ￿ 0; (2)
and for the ask side:
(E[e V j￿] ￿ Ase
L )QL ￿ (E[e V j￿] ￿ Ase
S )QS ￿ 0: (3)
A separating equilibrium occurs in the market when the expected pro￿t
from trading for informed traders is strictly positive, and the advantage due
to the large quantity exceeds the better price available for the small trades.
6Consider the ask side of market and suppose that, given the price schedule Pse,
the expected pro￿t from buying the large quantity of a trader observing ￿ is
strictly positive. The di⁄erence between the expected pro￿t from buying the




S )QS]. The ￿rst term represents the expected gain
due to the greater quantity of asset bought, and the second term is the loss due
to the higher price paid to purchase the ￿rst QS units of asset. An informed
trader endowed with ￿ chooses to place a large order if this di⁄erence is positive.
Clearly, the separating equilibrium is more likely to prevail when the distance
between the large and the small quantity is greater. The following proposition
states a necessary condition on QL and QS for a separating equilibrium to occur
on each side of market. Denote with ￿￿ and ￿￿ the informational content of
signals ￿ and ￿, where: ￿￿ ￿ p=(1 ￿ p) and ￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ p)=p.
Proposition 2 Given the public belief ￿, if a separating equilibrium prevails in








(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
se
SQL); (4)












A separating equilibrium can prevail in the market only if QL is su¢ ciently
larger than QS. From proposition 2, it follows that the minimum distance
between the large and the small quantity to observe a separating equilibrium
reduces as signals become more informative. Moreover, it is easy to verify that
in the absence of transaction costs, if QS and QL satisfy conditions 4 and 5, the
market equilibrium is separating. On the other hand, if the distance between
QL and QS is too small in relation to the informational advantage of informed
traders, a separating equilibrium never prevails in the market whatever ￿ is and







BQL￿￿￿, a separating equilibrium never occurs in the
market.
Proof. See Appendix.
7The minimum size of the relative distance between the large and the small
quantity depends on the probability of a large liquidity order. If the fraction
of liquidity traders is small, the information that the market maker can infer
from a large trading order is very accurate (￿
se
SQL is close to ￿￿). This, in turn,
implies that the di⁄erence between Bse
S and Bse
L and the di⁄erence between Ase
L
and Ase
S are signi￿cant and then the losses due to the worse prices in trading
QL rather than QS are high. Hence, QL has to be very large with respect to QS
in order to encourage informed traders to separate from small liquidity traders.













illustrates conditions on c for the occurrence of a separating equilibrium on the
bid and on the ask side of market.
Proposition 4 For any public belief ￿ such that condition 4 is satis￿ed, a sepa-
rating equilibrium prevails in the bid side of market if, and only if: c ￿ cse(￿; ￿),





)(V ￿ V ): Analogously,
for any public belief ￿ such that condition 5 is satis￿ed, a separating equilib-
rium prevails in the ask side of market if, and only if: c ￿ cse(￿; ￿), where





￿ ￿)(V ￿ V ):
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 4 points out that the threshold cost for a separating equilibrium
is lower than the informational advantage of informed traders, that is cne(￿; ￿).
We can conclude that a separating equilibrium prevails in the market only if
the large quantity is big enough with respect to the small quantity, and the
marginal transaction cost is very low.
3.3 The pooling equilibrium
In a market in the pooling equilibrium, informed traders submit both small and









to describe a pooling equilibrium, informed traders must be indi⁄erent between
trading the large and the small quantity. This condition requires:
(B
pe
L ￿ E[e V j￿])QL = (B
pe
S ￿ E[e V j￿])QS ￿ 0 (6)
(E[e V j￿] ￿ A
pc
L )QL = (E[e V j￿] ￿ A
pc
S )QS ￿ 0: (7)
For every price schedule satisfying condition 6, the optimal strategy of traders
observing the bad signal is any mixed strategy de￿ned on the simplex ￿(SL; SS)
if the expected pro￿t from selling is strictly positive, or any mixed strategy
de￿ned on the simplex ￿(SL; SS; NT) in the case of zero expected pro￿t.
Analogously, condition 7 implies that the optimal strategy of traders observing
the good signal is any mixed strategy de￿ned on the simplex ￿(BL; BS) if the
8expected pro￿t from buying is strictly positive, or any mixed strategy de￿ned
on the simplex ￿(BL; BS; NT) in the case of zero expected pro￿t.
It is immediate to see that if BL > BS, traders endowed with ￿ never
choose the small sale, and if AL < AS, traders observing ￿ never buy the small










More precisely, a pooling equilibrium with positive probability of no trading




S , and the pooling
equilibrium with positive probability of no trading for traders observing ￿ occurs





A pooling equilibrium with zero probability of no trading for informed traders









S . This, in tune, implies that informed traders are more likely to place
a large order.
The next proposition dictates conditions on c for the occurrence of a pooling
equilibrium on each side of market.
Proposition 5 For any public belief ￿ 2 (0; 1), a pooling equilibrium prevails
in the bid side of market if, and only if, c 2 (cse(￿; ￿); cne(￿; ￿)] and c ￿ 0. It
prevails in the ask side of market if, and only if, c 2 (cse(￿; ￿); cne(￿; ￿)] and
c ￿ 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
A pooling equilibrium prevails in the market when the marginal transaction
cost is lower than the informational advantage of traders observing a private
signal, but it is not low enough to induce informed to separate from small noise
traders. In particular, if conditions 4 and 5 are not satis￿ed, cse(￿; ￿) and
cse(￿; ￿) are negative and the market equilibrium is pooling every time the
informational advantage of informed traders exceeds the marginal transaction
cost.
In a market in the pooling equilibrium, the learning process about the true
asset value can be very slow. If the informational advantage of traders endowed
with a private signal slightly exceeds the transaction cost, then at the equilib-
rium the probability of an information based trading order is low. Moreover,
in a pooling equilibrium with positive probability of no trading for informed
traders, the informational content of a large trading order is the same as the
informational content of a small trading order. The information that the mar-
ket can infer from a trading order increases if the transaction cost is small with
respect to the informational advantage of traders observing a private signal. In
this case, the probability that an informed trader refrains from trading goes to
zero and the large orders become more informative than the small ones.
94 Comments and concluding remarks
In this paper we have examined the impact of trading costs proportional to
the order size on price discovery. We have shown that the occurrence of an
informational cascade does not depend on the amount of the asset traded. It
develops as the marginal transaction cost exceeds the informational advantage
of traders endowed with private information. Moreover, during a cascade no
informed trader chooses to trade at the equilibrium.
If the marginal transaction cost is not too big with respect to the informa-
tional advantage of informed traders, two equilibria can arise: the separating
equilibrium, where informed choose to trade only the large quantity, and the
pooling equilibrium, where informed choose to submit both large and small or-
ders with positive probability. The ￿rst outcome prevails in the market if two
conditions are satis￿ed: the marginal transaction cost has to be very low, and
the di⁄erence between the size of large and small orders must be su¢ ciently
large. Since in the separating equilibrium the spread at the large quantity ex-
ceeds the spread at the small quantity, if the large quantity is not large enough to
o⁄set the better prices for small orders, a separating equilibrium never prevails
whatever the transaction cost is.
Finally, the analysis has shown that as the public belief gets concentrated in
the extreme tails of the asset value distribution, the upper threshold costs for
both separating and trading equilibria reduce. Consequently, before an infor-
mational cascade develops, the trading volume gradually decreases.
10Appendix
Proof. of Proposition 2
Assume that a separating equilibrium prevails in the ask side of market and








(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
se
BQL): (8)
Simple algebra shows that 8 implies:
(E[e V j￿] ￿ E[ e V jBQL])QL ￿ (E[e V j￿] ￿ E[e V ])QS: (9)
Since Ase
L = E[ e V jBQL] + c and Ase
S = E[e V ] + c, 9 implies:
(E[e V j￿] ￿ Ase
L )QL < (E[e V j￿] ￿ Ase
S )QS
which contradicts the assumption that a separating equilibrium prevails in the
ask side of market. The part of the proof concerning the bid side of market is
analogous and it is omitted. 2
Proof. of Proposition 3




(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
se
SQL) and f￿(￿) =
1￿￿￿
￿se
BQL￿￿￿(￿ + (1 ￿
￿)￿
se
BQL). The proposition is proved immediately by noting that min￿2[0; 1] f￿(￿) =




Proof. of Proposition 4
The proof is straightforward by plugging Pse into conditions 2 and 3, and by
noting that condition 4 implies cse(￿; ￿) > 0 and condition 5 implies cse(￿; ￿) >
0. 2
Proof. of Proposition 5
We prove the proposition for the ask side of market. The proof for the
bid side is similar. First we consider the pooling equilibrium with positive
probability of no trading for traders observing ￿. This equilibrium requires that
the ask price for both the large and the small quantity equates the expected
asset value conditional to ￿.




S with the condition of zero market
maker￿ s expected pro￿t, we obtain: ￿ BQS = ￿ BQL = 1￿￿ NT
2 ￿ 1
2, where
f￿igi2A, is the equilibrium mixed strategy of traders observing ￿. Then, the
11ask side of market is characterized by a pooling equilibrium with no trading if
there exists a ￿ BQL ￿ 1
2 such that:
E[e V j￿] = V +
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿+￿(1￿p)￿ BQL
￿+￿p￿ BQL
￿ (V ￿ V ) + c:
We de￿ne the function f(x) de￿ned on [0; 1
2] as follows:
f(x) = E[e V j￿] ￿ V +
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿+￿x(1￿p)
￿+￿xp
￿ (V ￿ V ):
It is easy to see that:
￿ f0(x) < 0 for all x 2 [0; 1
2]
￿ minx2[0; 1
2] f(x) = f(1
2)
￿ maxx2[0; 1
2] f(x) = f(0)
We can conclude that there exists a ￿ BQS ￿ 1
2 such that f(￿ BQS) = c, if
and only if c 2 (f(1
2); f(0)]. This part of the proof is complete by noting that
f(0) = cne(￿; ￿) and f(1
2) > cse(￿; ￿).
Let￿ s move to consider the pooling equilibrium with zero probability of no









S with the condition of zero market maker￿ s ex-
pected pro￿t, we obtain: ￿ BQL = 1 ￿ ￿ BQS 2 (1
2; 1). So, the ask side of
market is characterized by a pooling equilibrium with ￿NT = 0, if there exists
a ￿ BQL 2 (1
2; 1) such that:
[(
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
￿
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿+￿(1￿p)￿ BQL
￿+￿p￿ BQL
) ￿ (V ￿ V ) ￿ c] ￿ QL =
[(
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
￿
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿+￿(1￿￿ BQL)(1￿p)
￿+￿(1￿￿ BQL)p
) ￿ (V ￿ V ) ￿ c] ￿ QS: (10)
We de￿ne the function g(￿) de￿ned on [1
2; 1] as follows:
g(￿) =
￿
















Condition 10 is satis￿ed if and only if there exists ￿ 2 (1
2; 1) such that g(￿)(V ￿
V ) = c. Since g(￿) is a strictly decreasing function, this is true when c 2
(g(1)(V ￿ V ); g(1
2)(V ￿ V )). The proposition for the ask side of market is
proved by noting that g(1)(V ￿ V ) = cse(￿; ￿), and g(1
2)(V ￿ V ) = f(1
2). 2
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